Model-driven Privacy Assessment in the Smart Grid

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Abstract: In a smart grid, data and information are transported, transmitted, stored, and processed with various stakeholders having to cooperate effectively. Furthermore, personal data is the key to many smart grid applications and therefore privacy impacts have to be taken into account. For an effective smart grid, well integrated solutions are crucial and for achieving a high degree of customer acceptance, privacy should already be considered at design time of the system. To assist system engineers in early design phase, frameworks for the automated privacy evaluation of use cases are important. For evaluation, use cases for services and software architectures need to be formally captured in a standardized and commonly understood manner. In order to ensure this common understanding for all kinds of stakeholders, reference models have recently been developed. In this paper we present a model-driven approach for the automated assessment of such services and software architectures in the smart grid that builds on the standardized reference models. The focus of qualitative and quantitative evaluation is on privacy. For evaluation, the framework draws on use cases from the University of Southern California microgrid.

1 INTRODUCTION

In a smart grid a number of stakeholders (actors) have to cooperate effectively. Interoperability has to be assured on many layers, ranging from high level business cases to low level network communication. Data and information is sent from one actor to another in order to ensure effective communication. Furthermore, the exchange of vast amounts of data is crucial for many smart grid applications, such as demand response (DR) or electric vehicle charging (Cavoukian et al., 2010), (Langer et al., 2013). However, this data is also related to individuals and privacy issues are an upcoming concern (McDaniel and McLaughlin, 2009), (Simmhan et al., 2011a). Especially the combination of data, e.g., meter values and preferences for DR can exploit serious privacy threats such as the prediction of personal habits. In system engineering, privacy is a cross-cutting concern that has to be taken into account throughout the entire development life-cycle, which is also referred to as privacy by design (Cavoukian et al., 2010).

Model-driven privacy assessment is especially useful when applied in software engineering. In (Boehm, 2006), the author thoroughly investigates the phases in software engineering and the expected costs for error correction and change requests. Costs double with every phase and once an application or a service is delivered, the additional adding of crosscutting concerns such as privacy is tied to enormous costs. As a result, design time privacy assessment is preferred in early phases of the software engineering process. Therefore, a framework is needed to (i) model the system, including high-level use cases and concrete components and communication flows; and (ii) to assess the system’s privacy impact using expert knowledge from the domain. Related work in the domain of automated assessments in the smart grid mainly focuses on security aspects and is not primarily concerned with privacy and the modeling in adherence to reference architectures.

In this paper we address these issues and present an approach for the model-driven assessment of privacy for smart grid applications. The framework proposed in this paper is designed to assist system engineers to evaluate use cases in the smart grid in an early design phase. For evaluation only meta-information is used and no concrete data is needed. We use Data Flow Graphs (DFG) to formally define use cases according to a standardized smart grid reference architecture. The assessment is based on an ontology
driven approach taking into account expert knowledge from various domains, including customer views on privacy as well as system engineering concerns. The output is a set of threats and a quantitative analysis of risks, i.e., a number indicating the strength of that threat. To evaluate the system we draw on insights from the University of Southern California microgrid. The primary contributions of this paper are (i) the use of DFGs to model use cases in the smart grid; (ii) the usage of DFGs for a quantitative privacy assessment; and (iii) the use of an ontology driven approach to capture domain knowledge.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 related work in the area of smart grid reference architectures, privacy evaluation and automated assessment tools is presented. In Section 3 the architecture of the proposed framework and its components are described. This includes the concept of DFGs for modeling use cases in the smart grid, the principal design of the ontology and the mapping of data flow graphs to the ontology, the methodology for defining threat patterns and finally, how these patterns are matched to use cases. The framework is evaluated with a set of representative use cases in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes this paper and gives an outlook to further work in this area.

2 RELATED WORK

In this section related work in the field of smart grid reference architectures, privacy evaluation and assessment as well as automated assessment tools are presented. Often, privacy and security are used interchangeably. For the purpose of this paper we refer to privacy as legally accessing data but not using it for the intended purpose. Security, by contrast, would involve the illegal acquisition of data. In both cases, the well established and widely understood terminology from security assessment is used, i.e., threat, attacker, vulnerability and countermeasure.

2.1 Reference Models

Stakeholders in the smart grid come from historically different areas, including electrical engineering, computer science and economics. To ensure interoperability and to foster a common understanding, standardization organizations are rolling out reference models and road maps. In the US the NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012) and in the EU the Smart Grid Reference Architecture (CEN, Cenelec and ETSI, 2012b) were published. The European Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) is based on the NIST Framework, but extends the model to better meet European requirements, such as distributed energy resources. In this paper we investigate use cases from the US. In particular we are focusing on use cases from the University of Southern California microgrid and we thoroughly discuss a typical DR use case. Investigations have, however, shown that for the purpose of this project all use cases from the US can be directly mapped to the European SGAM without the loss of information. Therefore we propose the utilization of the SGAM for two reasons: (i) the SGAM builds on the NIST model and allows to capture both, use cases from the US and the EU; and (ii) with the SGAM Toolbox (Dänekas et al., 2014) present a framework for modeling use cases based on the SGAM; in that way formally modeled use cases are the input for the evaluation.

2.2 Privacy

Privacy (and security) issues in the smart grid are addressed by standards in the US (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010) and the EU (CEN, Cenelec and ETSI, 2012a). Privacy, in specific, has no clear definition. According to a thorough analysis in (Wicker and Schrader, 2011), privacy can be defined as the right of an individual’s control over personal information. More formally this is defined by (Barker et al., 2009) in a four dimensional privacy taxonomy. The dimensions are purpose, visibility, granularity and retention. The purpose dimension refers to the intended use of data, i.e., what personal information is released for. The purpose ranges from single, a specific use only, to any. Visibility refers to who has permitted access. The range is from owner to all/world. Granularity describes to what extent information is detailed. The retention dimension finally is the period for storage of data. In any case, privacy is assured if all these dimensions are communicated clearly and fully disclosed to data owners and the compliance to the principles is governed. Hence, data is collected and processed for the intended purpose only, and the degree of visibility, granularity and retention is at the necessary minimum.

2.3 Assessment Tools

To measure the degree to which systems adhere to privacy requirements, approaches for automated qualitative assessments (resulting in statements of possible privacy impacts due to privacy critical actions or relationships) and quantitative assessments (resulting in a
In (Ahmed et al., 2007), the authors present an approach towards ontology based risk assessment. The authors propose three ontologies, the user environment ontology capturing where users are working, i.e., software and hardware, the project ontology capturing concepts of project management, i.e., work packages and tasks and the attack ontology capturing possible attacks, e.g., non-authorized data access, virus distribution or spam emails. For a risk assessment, attacks (defined in the attack ontology) are matched with information available from the other ontologies. For a quantitative assessment, the annual loss expectancy is calculated by combining a set of harmful outcomes and the expected impact of such an outcome with the frequency of that outcome. The approach presented by Ahmed et al. is designed for security issues and does not explicitly cover privacy assessments.

In (Kost et al., 2011) and (Kost and Freytag, 2012) an ontology driven approach for privacy evaluation is presented. The aim of these papers is to integrate privacy in the design process. High-level privacy statements are matched to system specifications and implementation details. The proposed privacy by design process includes the following phases: identification of high-level privacy requirements, translation of abstract privacy requirements to formal privacy descriptions, realization of the requirements and modeling of the system and analyzing the system by matching formal privacy requirements to the formal system model. Contrary to our work this approach is not focused on use cases in the smart grid and therefore does not model systems based on a standardized reference architecture.

A workflow oriented security assessment is presented in (Chen et al., 2013). This approach is not based on ontologies but on argument graphs. The presented framework uses security goal, workflow and system description, attacker model and evidence as an input. This information is aggregated in a discriminative set of argument graphs, each taking into account additional input. Nodes in the graph are aggregated using boolean expressions and the output is a quantitative assessment of the system. Instead of focusing on workflow analysis using graphs, we model systems as a whole in adherence to the standardized reference architecture using an ontology driven approach to integrate expert knowledge.

A considerably broader approach for an assessment tool that incorporates both, the balancing of privacy requirements and operational capabilities is presented in (Knirsch et al., 2015). This work presents a graph based approach that allows the modeling of systems with respect to the operational requirements of certain nodes (e.g., metering at a certain frequency) and the impact of privacy restrictions on subsequent nodes. The authors further present an optimum balancing algorithm, i.e. to what extent restrictions gained from privacy enhancing technologies and the necessary operational requirements can be combined. However, this needs sufficient information on how privacy is impacted by certain use cases which is provided by this work.

3 ARCHITECTURE

This section is dedicated to an architectural overview as well as a detailed discussion of the components. Figure 1 shows the principal components of the proposed architecture, including input and output. For a privacy assessment, the framework accepts two inputs, a use case UC modeled as a DFG in adherence to the SGAM and a set of threat patterns T. In order to qualitatively analyze this input the use case is mapped to individuals – i.e., instances of classes – of an ontology (sometimes referred to as the assertion box, ABox (Shearer et al., 2008)). The corresponding class model (sometimes referred to as the terminological box, TBox (Shearer et al., 2008)) is based on the SGAM. This qualitative analysis provides explicit and implicit information about the elements from the DFG: actors, components, information objects and their interrelation. The results of the qualitative assessment are the input for the subsequent quantitative analysis. The output of that analysis is finally a class c from a set of classes C that the use case is assigned to. A threat pattern t is used to describe potential threats, where t ∈ T and a class c represents a subset of threats T∗. A class c describes how threat patterns and the qualitative results are combined, which is presented as a threat matrix as an output. Note that the terminology threat matrix is borrowed from security analysis and that the output is not a matrix in the mathematical sense. A threat matrix compares a set of threats and the risk for these threats. Formally, the classifier is defined as Assign UC to c, if t ∈ T∗, ∀t ∈ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ {C}. A threat exploits a set of vulnerabilities and is mitigated by a set of countermeasures. Each threat pattern can be evaluated for itself or multiple patterns are combined to classes of threats. A vulnerability is any kind of privacy impact for any kind of stakeholder or actor. Threats are evaluated using the attack vector model which is adapted from security analysis and defined in detail later in this paper. In general, an attack is feasible, if given (i) an attacker; (ii) a privacy asset; and (iii) the resources to perform the
attack. Hence, a receiver or collector of privacy critical data items is potentially able to access these assets and to use them in a way not corresponding to the original purpose. This is formally represented as \( \langle \text{data access}, \text{privacy asset}, \text{attack resources} \rangle \).

3.1 Data Flow Graphs

In order to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the privacy impact of a use case a formalization is crucial. In this section we introduce the concept of Data Flow Graphs (DFG) for the smart grid based on a model-driven design approach originally presented in (Dänekas et al., 2014) and (Neureiter et al., 2013). DFGs formally capture all aspects of use cases in the smart grid in adherence to the SGAM. They contain high-level business cases as well as detailed views of a system’s characteristics such as encryption and protocols. DFGs are a powerful tool as they allow both, easy modeling and full adherence to the reference architecture. Furthermore, in the graph relationships between actors, as well as the transported information objects (IO) are modeled. Nodes in a graph represent business actors, system actors or components and edges represent data flows annotated with IOs. In accordance to the standard (CEN, Cenelec and ETSI, 2012b), DFGs consist of the following five layers:

1. Business Layer. In a DFG this layer is a high level description of the business case. Business actors, their common business goal and their business requirements are modeled.

2. Function Layer. The function layer details the business case by mapping business actors to system actors and by dividing the high level business goals in use cases and steps.

3. Information Layer. This layer describes information flows in detail. System actors communicate to each other through IOs. IOs are characterized by describing information attributes on a meta-level. An IO is one of the key data used for classification and is discussed in greater detail below.

4. Communication Layer. The communication layer is a more detailed view on communication taking into account network and protocol specifications.

5. Component Layer. In a DFG this layer contains concrete components. Therefore system actors are mapped to components and devices.

Each layer is a directed graph. Both, nodes and edges can have attributes. The semantics, however, are varying. For instance, where attributed edges in the business layer describe a business case, in the information layer concrete meta-data of communication flows are captured. Even though implicitly covered in the model presented above, for automated evaluation we introduce two additional layers: Between business and function layer we include the Business Actor to System Actor Mapping and between communication and component layer the System Actor to Component Mapping. This allows to capture the complexity of use cases on different levels while still maintaining the cross-layer relationship between high-level business actors and their representation as components. These layers are directed graphs as well, with edges indicating the mapping. The mapping defines a one to many relationship from business actors to system actors and from system actors to components. In the European Smart Grid Reference Architecture with the SGAM Methodology an approach for mapping use cases to the reference model is suggested. DFGs build on this methodology focusing on actors and their interrelation. An implementation for modeling DFGs in UML is available as the SGAM Toolbox\(^1\). Data Flow Graphs contain explicit information (what is modeled) and implicit information (what can be concluded). Conclusions are drawn using ontology reasoning.

3.2 Ontology Design

The ontology driven approach for classification has been chosen for two main reasons: (i) ontologies are powerful for capturing domain knowledge explicitly; and (ii) through logic reasoning (Shearer et al., 2008) ontologies are a source for implicit knowledge. The power of ontologies to formally capture knowledge and how to draw conclusions is discussed in (Garaino et al., 2009). The power of reasoning for gaining

\(^1\)http://www.en-trust.at/downloads/sgam-toolbox/
3.3 Threat Patterns

In this paper we evaluate the privacy impact on customers, thus we identified the following list of typical high-level threats based on literature reviews (Cavoukian et al., 2010), (Langer et al., 2013), (Simmhan et al., 2011a). These threats have been modified in order to be more representative for the use cases from the University of Southern California microgrid that are investigated in this paper. Subsequently, IOs that may cause these threats are determined.

Customer presence at home. This privacy concern is discussed in (Cavoukian et al., 2010). To potentially determine a person’s presence at home, some device in the customer premises is needed. This device collects data at a certain frequency, high enough to have a resolution that allows to draw conclusions on the energy usage of specific devices. Furthermore, data collected from that device needs to be sent to another actor (i.e., a utility). At the utility an individual or a system needs to have access to the data in an appropriate resolution. Since we always assume that data is accessed legally, we do not focus on unallowed data access. Additionally, the total delay of the data transmission is of relevance. If data is collected and transmitted in almost real time the presence at home can be determined immediately. If data is available with a delay only, the analysis of past events and predictions might be possible. If this information is published, an attacker might exploit this vulnerability in order to break in the house.

Tracking customer position. This threat is especially interesting for electric vehicle charging. Assuming the customer has some identification towards the charging station, at least the location, a timestamp and the amount of energy consumed will be recorded for billing. Depending on the design of the infrastructure only little information will be sent to the operator or a very detailed profile of the customer is maintained. Here, the multiplicity of the actors is crucial and the fact that different actors have access to the same data. Attacks for this threat are described in (Langer et al., 2013), e.g., using information for targeted ads, for tracking movements to certain places or to infer the income based on recharges.
3.4 Pattern Matching

Actual classification is done in the pattern matching process. For each actor in the DFG and the ontology, respectively, the attack vector is determined, i.e., to which resources does an actor have access and what is the effort. If that shows feasible matching this is seen as a threat. It can be retrieved immediately from the ontology if an actor has access to a certain IO. This is done by evaluating actor and data object properties and by incorporating information from the pre-classifiers. Furthermore, relationships on the business layer and data properties such as encryption are taken into account. The following, discriminative set of classifiers is used to determine potential threats:

1. For each information object the data provider and the data collector are determined (according to the terminology defined in (Barker et al., 2009)) and it is assessed who has access to the data. This yields a list of three-tuples in the form (information object (IO), data provider (DP), data collector (DC)). Then it is determined if an information object either contains sensitive or direct personal data (according to the terminology defined in (The European Parliament and the Council, 1995)). This yields another three-tuple in the form (information object (IO), sensitive (S), direct personal (DP)). Finally it is determined if the attacker has actual data access, yielding one more three-tuple in the form (information object (IO), data access (A)). Data access depends on the relationship of actors, on data resolution, retention and encryption. Matching these tuples to each other results in the components of the attack vector, recalling (data access, privacy asset, attack resources) yields $\langle$ IO, DP, DC, IO, S, DP, IO, DC, A $\rangle$. An exemplary attack vector for a DR use case where DR preferences are sent to the utility is $\langle$ DR preferences, customer, utility, DR preferences, false, false, DR preferences, utility, true $\rangle$. This already provides thorough qualitative analysis. It is possible to determine which actor can potentially threaten the privacy of another actor. It is even possible to conclude how and where this might happen. However, for a quantitative assessment the risk for a particular threat is calculated. While a qualitative assessment is useful in supporting detailed system design decisions and evaluation, for a very first outline of the overall system characteristics, a quantitative value is much more expressive. Further, providing a numeric value for the system’s privacy impact helps to easily compare and contrast proposed designs.

Risk is calculated as the product of the probability of occurrence (PO) and the expected loss (EL). For the set $T^*$ a number of patterns $t_{i0}, \ldots, t_{iN}$ and $t_{c1}, \ldots, t_{cM}$, respectively is defined. A pattern therefore contains a set of conditions for vulnerabilities $t_{i},$ countermeasures $t_{c},$ respectively. Conditions are SPARQL ASK queries\(^4\) that return either true or false if the pattern applies or not. For brevity, $t_{i}'$ denotes the number of vulnerabilities that apply, $t_{c}'$ the number of countermeasures that apply and $t_i$ and $t_c$ denote the total number of vulnerabilities and countermeasures, respectively. In this paper we propose the following approach for determining values for the probability of occurrence $PO(t_{i}', t_{c}')$ and the expected loss $EL(t_{i}', t_{c}')$:

$PO(t_{i}', t_{c}')$ is determined by defining a plane that satisfies the following conditions: $PO(t_{i}' = 0, t_{c}' = 0) = 1$, $PO(t_{i}' = 0, t_{c}' = t_i) = 0$ and $PO(t_{c}' = 0, t_{i}' = 0) = \frac{1}{2}$. This yields $PO(t_{i}', t_{c}') = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{t_{c}}{t_i} - \frac{t_i}{t_c} + 1)$. A linear model is chosen due to its simplicity and might be extended by more complex approaches in future. A condition that is of type vulnerability increases $EL(t_{i}', t_{c}')$, a condition of type countermeasure decreases $EL(t_{i}', t_{c}')$. The value of $EL(t_{i}', t_{c}')$ is defined in the pattern. Risk $R$ is finally defined by $R = PO(t_{i}', t_{c}')EL(t_{i}', t_{c}')$.

To feed in the results gained from the qualitative analysis, certain variables in the query can be bound to instances. For example, given the following fraction of a query (where usc denotes the namespace prefix for actors and IOs in the University of Southern California microgrid) $\langle$io usc:isSentBy ?systemactor . ?systemactor usc:isRealizationOf ?businessactor . ?businessactor a usc:BusinessActor to determine if some information object is sent by some business actor. It is now possible to bind the variable $\langle$io to a concrete value as determined in the qualitative assessment, e.g., $\langle$io InformationObject.CustomerName. This allows to assess a particular impact on a particular information object or component/actor based on the previously calculated attack vectors.

We developed generic patterns for typical threats, i.e., such as the ones mentioned above. The framework is, however, not limited to this set of patterns and allows the definition of an arbitrary number of additional patterns to meet the individual needs of the application scenario. The output of the framework is a threat matrix contrasting the results from the qualitative analysis and from the quantitative risk assessment. For a UC, a threat matrix contains the attack vector and the assigned risk for the determined class $c$.

For illustrative purposes, the following listing shows an example pattern for customer presence at

\(^4\)http://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/
home. This includes the vulnerability device in customer premises (exemplary assigned an EL of 4) and the countermeasure aggregation of data from multiple customers (exemplary assigned an EL of -6).

4 EVALUATION

For evaluating the framework new, previously unused use cases are applied. The set of threat patterns and their impact on privacy is based on the aforementioned literature reviews. We are therefore using a representative set of use cases describing typical applications in the smart grid. This includes, but is not limited to, smart metering, electric vehicle charging and DR. In this section a real-life use case from the University of Southern California microgrid is evaluated as an example. This use case has been chosen as (i) simple enough to verify results based on literature reviews; and (ii) complex enough to have an interesting combination of actors and information flows. We are focusing on a DR scenario similar to the one described in (Simmhan et al., 2011b). This scenario is outlined in Figure 3. A customer interested in DR creates an online profile stating on which DR actions the customer is interested to participate (e.g., turning down air condition). When the utilities want to curtail load with DR, a customer whose profile fits the current requirements is sent a text message to, e.g., turn down the air condition. This message is acknowledged by the customer and the utility further reads the meter values to track actual power reduction. Besides the data flows mentioned, this further involves the storing of the profile and the past behavior of the customer for a more accurate prediction. For modeling this use case as a DFG, the following actors and IOs are identified. Evaluation is performed with a prototypical implementation that uses DFGs and threat patterns as an input and produces a threat matrix as an output.

4.1 Data Flow Graph

Actors. Business actors are the user and the utility. The user is mapped to the system actors smart meter, device and portal. DR requests are sent to the user device (e.g., a cell phone) and the user’s DR preferences are set in the portal (e.g., a web service). The smart meter is used to measure actual curtailment. The utility is mapped to a DR repository, containing preferences for each user and past behavior, to a prediction unit predicting DR requests based on the preferences and a control unit to meter user feedback and actual curtailment.

Information Objects. Cross-domain/zone information flows include user preferences sent to the utilities, DR requests sent to the user from the utility and both, the user acknowledge/decline and the measured curtailment reveal if a customer (i) responded to the DR request; and (ii) actually participated in DR; both is a indication for the presence at home. For this threat we identified four vulnerabilities (device in customer premises, collecting data at a certain frequency, receiver has access to data, data retention is unlimited) and one countermeasure (aggregation of data from multiple customers), resulting in a PO of 0.9, an EL of 11.5 and a risk value of 10.35.

Tracking customer position. In our case, this threat might apply in two different scenarios: First, this threat is immediate if the acknowledge/decline response to DR requests contains the customer position (e.g., if sent by a cell phone or other mobile device). This does not only show the customers past and present position, but also if the customer is able
to remotely control devices in his premises. Second, when the customer is represented by an additional component electric vehicle charging station. Assuming that DR requests are also sent with respect to the charging behavior. Based on the amount of energy the customer is willing to DR it might be possible to estimate the consumption of the electric vehicle and subsequently the traveled distance. For this threat we identified two vulnerabilities (composition of location and timestamp, different actors have access to the same data) and one countermeasure (aggregation of data from multiple customers), resulting in a PO of 0.66, an EL of 5 and a risk value of 3.33.

The mode-driven assessment of the DR use case has shown that the risk of tracking customer position is low compared to the risk of determining customer presence at home. This result stems from the fact that there apply a number of vulnerabilities with high expected loss value, hence a device in the customer premises, data collected at a certain frequency, receiver has access to data and unlimited data retention.

5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper we introduced a framework for the model-driven privacy assessment in the smart grid. The framework builds on an ontology driven approach matching threat patterns to use cases that are modeled in adherence to standardized reference architectures. The approach presented here builds on meta-information and high-level data flows. It has been shown how to utilize this framework to successfully assess the privacy impact on use cases in early design time. Exemplary threats and exemplary use cases draw on insights from the University of Southern California microgrid. Future work will include an evaluation of the systems ability to generalize to arbitrary kinds of threats in the smart grid. Furthermore the system will be extended to serve as a policy decision point for system developers and customers in a smart grid IT infrastructure.

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